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The purpose of this paper is to introduce the non-specialist to the basic theory of complete markets, providing the reader with an insight into the nature of markets and recent financial innovations in particular. The paper first introduces the major concepts of the state-preference approach to uncertainty, illustrating them with a parimutuel gambling example. In this framework, the notion of completeness arises naturally as the extreme case in which bettors have the greatest range of opportunities to bet on the outcome of a race. The terminology is then transferred to an economic context) where again, complete markets provide consumers, producers and investors the most flexibility in allocating payoffs and planning for uncertain contingencies. Particular attention is given to the markets for futures and options.
Such securities are shown to improve the efficiency of the marketplace, a result with implications for regulatory policy.
In the real world, systems of markets are not complete, as we shall seeThe notion of completeness, however, is of interest for two reasons. First, it serves as a theoretical benchmark, relative to which incompleteness can be assessed; such a comparison might, for example, suggest whether incompleteness implies inefficiency in a particular model. Second, although the notion of market completeness appears most often in theoretical discussions, the ideas involved can also be applied to more realistic problems. For example, in the state-preference context, markets for so-called "derivative" securities -futures and options -add value by providing investors with flexibility in fashioning their portfolios; thus, they make systems of markets less incomplete. The popularity of such securities can thus be explained from a theoretical perspective that incorporates complete markets. in some cases, the theory can even suggest new markets that would alleviate existing incompleteness.
THE THEORETICAL APPARATUS
The tools and results of the theory of complete markets represent one the most significant developments of theoretical economics in this century.
2 At the same time, the concepts enihedded in the theory are very general and have been used in many other economic contexts. Thus, our first task is to explore the basic structure of state-preference theory. We do this with a simple gambling example, because it involves a well-defined and relatively small collection of outcomes and payoffs in an uncertain environment. 3
2 The theory can be traced to the work of Arrow (1964 ), Debreu (1959 , Arrow & Debreu (1954) and Mckenzie (1954) in the mid-1950s. Both Arrow and Debreu were later awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (Arrow in 1972 , Debreu in 1983 , largely for their work in developing the theory of complete markets and applying it to the problem of general equilibrium. The theory is often cited in the guise of its two most common avatars, the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium theory and statepreference theory; it also often appears as its implicit counterpart, the theory of incomplete markets. The miterature applying state-preference theory and the theory of complete markets is lengthy; for a partial list, consult the references in Radner (1982) and Debreu (1982) . Previous articles have recognized the connection between gambling and economic activity, especially financial markets. See, for example, Gabriel & Marsden (1990) or Asch, Malkiel & Quandt (1984) , and the references therein. 
One dominant theme of state-preference theory and complete markets is uncertainty, though we may have definite opinions at the start of the day, we cannot know the state of the world for sure until the race has been run.
IĨ State-preference theory incorporates uncertainty by defining outcomes, or potential future states, only one of which will ultimately be realized, The theory has been fruitfully applied in many areas of economics, especially in the study of financial markets. For now, however, consider An event is a collection of one or more states, 'Fhus, for example, "Mastercharger wins the -race" is an event, It includes two states, M-T-C and M-C-T, both of which are consistent with the stated criterion, an imaginary racetrack called Portfolio Downs.
All bets are placed on events. If the state of
We are bettors at Portfolio Downs, hoping to win enough for an early retirement. To make our life simpler, the track's management has done away with the tote board.~Instead, all bets are placed at fixed odds with the track's official bookmaker. This allows us to confine our uncertainty to the race itself, without worrying that the posted odds might shift after we've the world that ultimately occurs is an element of the event, then the bet pays off at the fixed odds; otherwise the bet pays nothing. In an economic system, the relevant vanthe positions in the vector are in the same order as the states listed above. Alternatively, a ables might include the structure of the tax $2 trifecta bet on the ranking C-T-M that pays I I code. global weather patterns, infant mortality rates, scientific discoveries, etc. 'I'he relevant time horizon might be stated in periods as long as a decade or as short as a second; it might cxtend into both the past and the future for a few hours or many centuries.
off at 3-to-i odds has the payoff vector:
In state-preference theory, a market is equivalent to a payoff vector: a market represents the ability to exchange goods or payoffs. At the racetrack, we exchange pre-race dollars we can arrange a portfolio with any conceivable characte istic of a complete system of markets payoff vector. We may not want certain payoff is that, without a wealth constraint, any convectors, and even among tho e we do find de ceivable payoff vector can be arranged. In sirable, our decision on which portfolio terms of hnear algebra, a complete ystem of ultimately to arrange will depend both on their markets is one in which the set of available be s prices and our resources, These i sues of desircontains enough linearly independent payoff ability and affordability are secondary for th vectors to span the space of all conceivable notion of completenes , however. in etled --lic'rn e Wi' negatiC' jnivolfs \hithe-~Il of tllis genet'ali~.estliret'tlv to situations tnatii'd1~, tins rthe sjnti' as ZldditlQ a ni-ga-
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Suppose that the race is the three-horse affair described earlier, To make things challenging, further suppose that the resident bookmaker will accept only win bets and place bets, refusing to take the seemingly more complicated quinellas, trifectas, etc.°Finally, to make completeness an intriguing proposition, suppose that we get a hot tip from our pal in the stables t that the race is fixed: the final outcome will be M-T-C. Because we trust our pal, we now want to bet only on this single state of the world, 'rhe key question for market completeness is: can we do it, using only win and place bets?
First, note that we aren't satisfied with a bet on Mastercharger to win: in this bet, we would also be buying a payoff in state M-C-T, which we're convinced won't occur, With consistent odds, our payoff per dollar wagered can't be as high betting Mastercharger to win (i,e,, betting on the event, [M-T-C, M-C-T]), or betting Tricky Bond to place (i,e,, the event,
, as it would be on the M-T-C tnfecta bet,bo We want a portfolio of bets with a payoff vector that looks like this: (O,O,x,O,O,O) , where x is some positive number, to make the maximum profit on our bet, The number x should equal exactly the payoff we would get on the M-T-C trifecta bet, if only the bookmaker would allow trifecta bets, 9 Show bets are superfluous here, because in a three-horse race, alt show bets automatically pay off. Thus, they're not really wagers at all. Also note that, although a trifecta might seem complex, it is in a sense the simplest bet here, because it pays off in only one state. This would not be true of tnifecta bets if there were more than three horses or more than one race, 10 "Consistent" simply means that the odds on any event are inversely related to the probability, in the bookmaker's view, of it occurring -the more likely an event, the lower its odds. Consistent odds are related to the probability of an event, e, by the formula: 0, = (1/P(e)) -1, where 0, is the odds ratio for the event e, and P(e) is the probability that e will occur. With consistency, the probabilities of all the individual outcomes add up to 100 percent, It turns out we cannot achieve this payoff vector from the available bets, an upshot of the fact that this system of markets is not complete. In practical terms, if the system of markets were complete, then we could get higher odds on a bet paying off in the event M-T-C than we can get with the current incomplete set, as will be demonstrated below, To see more clearly what this means, let's experiment with the numbers, Suppose that the bookmaker gives odds on the six allowable bets, implying the six payoff vectors listed in table 1. These payoffs have been rounded off to the nearest penny. They include the initial wager of $2 plus any profit from the wager, which depends on the odds,"
To say that one of the bets is redundant means that its payoffs in the six outcomes can be replicated by an appropriate portfolio of the other bets,' 2 The number of outcomes (six) equals the number of bets (six), but exceeds the number of non-redundant bets (five); the system of markets is thus incomplete. Any payoff vector attainable by combinations of the six bets is still attainable if we disallow one of the redundant bets and include combinations consisting only of the other five, "To convert between odds and payoffs, use the formula:
, where p is the payoff, b is the size of the bet (e.g., $2), and 0, is the odds ratio (e.g., 7-3 odds imply 0, = 7/3 2.33). "Redundancy requires that we be able to take bets as well as place them. By taking bets, we can arrange for a negative payoff in certain events. For convenience, we assume that the bookmaker at Portfolio Downs meets this need by placing bets at his posted odds. It is also convenient if we assume that bets can be both taken and placed in any fractional amount, allowing us to fine-tune our portfolio. Table 1 PAYOFFS BY OUTCOME For example, we can construct the sixth bet as a portfolio of the other five, Consider first a $34 bet on Charge Me Interest to place" Ignoring the rounding error, 17($2,35) = $4000, and our payoffs would be (0,$40,0,$40,$40,$40) under the six possible outcomes, Now consider a portfolio that consists of different amounts of the other five bets, either taken (negative payoffs) or placed (positive payoffs), In particular, let the amounts be those listed in table 2, For example, we take 12 $2 bets on Tricky Bond to place, while placing 12 $2 bets on the same horse to win, The payoffs to our portfolio are given by totaling the six columns in the table, The portfolio yields the same result as if we had placed a $34 bet on Charge Me Interest to place. In fact, since we placed $80 in bets while taking $46 worth, our net investment in the portfolio is $(-80+46) = -$34, The fact that equivalent payoff vectors require the same investment reveals that our bookmaker has set the odds (i,e,, payoffs) in a consistent way.
I
One way to look at the redundancy of one of our bets is that we cannot synthesize the trifecta bet that we're after. Even though we would place such a bet at any consistent positive odds (because we're convinced we know the outcomet hat bet is neither offered directly nor can we synthesize it from the others, In other words, we can't get there from here,
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Another way to look at this is that the bookmaker' can drop a redundant bet from the list of allowable bets without affecting our opportunities, it turns out that, in our example, the six bets are mutually redundant: any bet that is omitted can be reconstituted from the remaining five, The same procedure that was just used to reconstitute the sixth bet could be applied to generate any of the individual bets from the other five," Let's drop a bet then and replace it with a non-redundant betFor example, suppose the bookmaker does not offer a bet on Mastercharger to place. Instead of that bet, he gives 3-1 odds on a trifecta bet on the ranking C-M-T, 'The odds and the implicit payoffs now available to us are given in table 3, 'rhe fourth row of the original payoff array has been replaced by the payoffs to the new tnfecta bet, The question is still whether we can arrange a portfolio of bets that pays off only when the ranking is M-T-C, That is, can we synthesize an M-T-C trifecta bet? More generally, is the system of markets complete? The answer to both questions is yes. The system of markets is complete, which implies that we can achieve any payoff vector, including the payoff vector that corresponds to an M-T-C trifecta bet, To synthesize that bet, combine the bets as descr'ibed in table 4. The result is a net twodollar investment that only pays off if the final outcome of the race is M-T-C, The payoff in that case is $40, implying 19-to-i odds," By creating a bet that pays off under such narrow circumstances, we have maximized the return on our $2 investment (assuming our pal in the stables is trustworthy!), With a complete system of markets, of course, we can also generate a safer portfolio-that is, one that pays off in "Using 17 two-dollar tickets ($34) simply keeps all the following payoffs in terms of nice round numbers. We could just as welt scale all the amounts and payoffs down by a factor of 17 to show the same result, "This is not necessarily the case with redundant bets. Consider, for example, three redundant bets on two outcomes: (0,1), (1,1) and (2,2). If (2,2) is dropped, it can be reconstituted from (1,1). If (0,1) is dropped, however, it cannot be synthesized from (II) and (2,2).
"Again, the scale of the payoffs is unimportant here, Forty dollar amounts are used to keep the numbers consistent with the previous example, The important result is that the portfolio pays off only in one specific state of the world. Table 3 PAYOFFS BY OUTCOME
more states-but this would be more costly. For example, to get the same payoff in one additional outcome, M-C-T (i.e., to achieve the payoff vector (0,0,$40,$40,0,0)), would require an $8 bet on Mastercharger to win, a four-fold increase from the investment required for the trifecta bet, It is no accident that the number of bets in the portfolio equals the number of possible outcomes, 1°E very portfolio we construct is a system of six linear equations in some unknowns, namely the amounts to put into each of the allowable bets, In other words, we start with six state-dependent payoffs (the desired payoff vector), and we seek a combination of weights (ic,, investment amounts) for the available bets that yield those six payoffs. To ensure that such a combination exists, we need at least six unk nowns (ic., available bets) to work with, Furthermore, some collection of six of those available bets must have payoff vectors that are linearly independent.
"An allowable bet is included in the count, even if the amount wagered on that bet is zero, The decision to wager nothing on a particular allowable bet is an implicit portfolio decision, "'We shall see below that this situation is not usually a practical consideration, The normal problem is that there are not enough unknowns (available bets) rather than too many.
What if there are more unknowns than equations (i.e., more available bets than elements in the desired payoff vector)?" In that case, at least some of the bets must be redundant, Thus, of markets count equathe largest in determining whether the system is complete, it is not safe simply to tions and unknowns; we must find collection of non-redundant bets, In our example, if we can find six non-redundant bets, then every payoff vector is the result of a unique combination of these six bets. Thus, in our example, the only way to achieve the payoff (0,0, $40,0,0,0) is to combine the bets in the amounts ($12, -$24,0, -$10,$20,0)
Finally, there is one last bit of terminology which appears frequently in state-preference theory. In our example, a trifecta bet has a positive payoff in one state only; in all other states, its payoff is zero, Notice that all other bets consist of various collections of trifecta bets. Clearly then, a set of six different trifecta bets would produce a complete system of markets, This (N I I aleads to the notion of a reference bet or pure security. A pure security is a normalized bet that pays off in only one state. By normalized, we mean that the payoff in the selected state is one unit)8 To get a normalized payoff) we must adjust the amount invested in that bet. The wager amount that implies the normalized payoff is called the price of the pure securicv. Any state-contingent claim can be regarded as a collection of pure securities. A system of markets is complete if and only if the number of attainable pure securities (either directly or through combination of other securities) equals the number of outcomes.
SOME ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS
Historically, the theoretical economics literature has generally followed two distinct, but entirely compatible hnes in interpreting and applying the theory of complete markets. First, led by the initiators of the theory) there were applications to the problem of general equilibrium. Most work in this area now starts with the notion that markets are not complete and proceeds to analyze the nature of equilibrium (or disequihbrium) with incomplete marketsJT he other line of research has focused on the relative efficiency of financial markets at allocating risk by providing greater investment flexibility to investors, in the same way that a complete system of markets makes bettors better off at Portfolio Downs. In practice, the general equilibrium applications tend to de-emphasize uncertainty and concentrate on production, consumption and intertemporal optimization. Conversely, the financial market applications tend to ignore real resource constraints and temporal factors, in order to concentrate on uncertainty.
The first section of this paper considered the properties of betting odds at an imaginary racetrack. Our goal in that example was to find some conditions that would ensure complete investment flexibility. In the process, we developed a simple context in which to introduce the terminology of complete markets. An analogy can be made between Portfolio Downs and real markets. Bookmakers manage their risk by laying off bets, while investors manage their risk by hedging their portfolios; bettors are unsure whether Tricky Bond will win the race, while investors are unsure if pet rocks will be popular with consumers; etc. 2°O ur next task is to flesh out this analogy to see what importance state-preference theory can have for more general economic analysis. This is done with a series of examples.
Multiple Periods~Multiple CommoditIes
One of the primary insights of state-preference theory is that the traditional notion of what constitutes an economic good can be readily extended in a way that allows us to examine economic behavior across time and under uncertainty. At the same time, this extension forces us to think of 'goods" in a very different way. Our notion of a good is broadened in two directions: time and state.
Examining the time dimension first, consider a simple example involving a banana and an apple. A textbook would tell us that each consumer has a set of preferences such that she either prefers one to the other or is indifferent between them. In our new way of looking at things, however, we must include a time dimension in a description of the commodity. From this new perspective, "apple" is not sufficient to describe a good; one must specify either "apple today" or "apple tomorrow." Merely specifying "apple" is analogous to stating "red" without specifying "red tricycle" or "red Ferrari."
To make the example more specific, suppose that our consumer generally prefers apples at time t, A,, to bananas, B,, but that variety is also valuable to her. In this case, the following preferences for consumption over two consecutive days might hold:
IBAt Portfolio Downs everything is measured in dollars, so a pure security would be a trifecta bet that paid $1 if the outcome was the ranking specified in the bet. Pure securities are also called Arrow-Debreu securities or primitive securitie& 19 See Geanakoplos (1990) for some examples. 20
The terms "laying off bets," 'covering a position," and 'hedging or reinsuring a portfolio" all refer to the same basic process of reversing a transaction with one party by making a countermanding transaction with a third party.
For example, a bookmaker who takes a large bet on some event from a bettor can lay it off by placing a bet on the same event with another bookmaker, I 1 (A 0 ,A,,B 0 ,B) . With our new definition of commodities in mind, the four sequences ranked above can be treated under standard utility theory exactly as four commodity bundles, each composed of a pair of the four different commodities. One might consider, for example, the indifference curves between apples today and bananas today, or budgeting between apples today and apples tomorrow.
An infinite number of other bundles could also be described and ranked, of course. For example, (15,0,3,7) is a possible bundle, one that would be preferable to any of those listed above. Restricting the time dimension to two days and considering the resulting four goods, we see that the system of markets defined by the four bundles here is incomplete: we can get bundle 1 by buying bundles 3 and 4 while selling bundle 2. Thus, there are at most three non-redundant markets for four goods.2Ũ
ncertainty
The same approach is used to incorporate uncertainty. To do so, the definition of a commodity is expanded to include the state of the world. Thus, for example, an umbrella in the rain is now a fundamentally different commodity from an umbrella on a sunny day 22 Similarly, "bananas in peacetime" are different from "bananas in wartime." This new application, however, fundamentally expands our notion of a good, Because states of the world, by definition, are mutually exclusive, we must separate the notion of economic consumption from that of physical consumption. For example, if we purchase the bundle of goods consisting of "an apple in peacetime tomorrow" and "a banana in wartime tomorrow," we shall not be eating both apple and banana tomorrow; we shall eat only one or the other, Because the additional consideration of time and uncertainty forces such a radical shift in our conception of commodities, it is worthwhile to consider it further. The distinctions between apples and bananas, today and tomorrow, and peace and war serve as a simple basis for an example Suppose that, today, the political situation is peaceful, but tomorrow's situation is uncertain. This implies two possible states of the world: peace today, peace tomorrow, and peace today, war tomorrow. We thus have six commodities, abbreviated as follows:23
Commodity Abbreviation
Suppose now that the local wholesaler, Whimsical Fruits, sells the "fruit baskets" or state claims described in table 5.
This admittedly contrived example (note, for example, that basket No. 4 consists of 364 apples today and 364 apples tomorrow, plus 364 "bonus" bananas to be delivered only in case of war tomorrow) allows for ready interpretation, because of its similarity to an earlier example. The array of goods here is essentially identical to the payoff array for Portfolio Downs; only the labels and the scale have been changed. At Portfolio Downs, the only distinction between goods was the state of the world; the physical commodity in all cases was cash, and time differences did not exist. At Whimsical Fruits, on the other hand, the goods have different interpretations, and all the amounts are scaled up by a factor of 100; otherwise, the payoff array is identical to that in table 1, We can therefore conclude immediately that the fruit market here is incomplete, For example, a buyer wanting only to buy apples to be delivered tomorrow in 21 There is, of course, no reason to limit the time dimension to two days. By extending the time dimension indefinitely, we get an infinite number of goods, which would require an infinite number of markets for a complete system. 22 street vendors in New York, for example, charge $3 for an umbrella under clear skies, and $5 for an umbrella when it's raining, 23 Note that there are only two states of the world, distinguished by the political situation tomorrow. Thus, for the commodities dated today, the true state of the world is uncertain, although the current political situation is known to be peace. In principle, therefore, we should distinguish between apple-peace tomorrow-today and apple-war tomorrow-today. As a practical matter, however, we cannot observe this distinction until it is too late for it to affect our behavior, For convenience, the distinction is not made in the example. 
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case of peace cannot arrange such a transaction as a mixture of the baskets offered at Whimsical Fruits.
Do Complete Markets Really Exist?
We now have a sufficient context to ask whether markets are complete in reality. The answer from economists who have considered this question is a resounding "No." 24 The problem is the huge number of markets that would be required for completeness to hold, Even with the roughest distinctions (e.g., measuring time in one-year intervals, considering all automobiles in a given year as perfect substitutes, etc.), an astonishing number of states of the world must still be considered. For example, every conceivable future invention must be included. Furthermore, the timing of invention is significant; if a cure for cancer comes in 1.997 instead of 1998, that implies a different state of the world. Some would have us distinguish goods by geographical location and even by the identity of the final consumer! 25 We need to multiply the number of states by the number of periods and then by the number of physical goods and services. Finally, we need a market with which to exchange every one of these many goods with every other one.
The absence of many markets from a real economy may be explained by transaction costs. For example, a contract for "an apple dated 2006 if a cure for cancer is discovered in 1997" is too costly to arrange, relative to the marginal benefit of such a transaction. Such a commodity is too narrowly defined to be of interest.
Turning to a more plausible example, the International Monetary Market (1MM) of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) established an organized marketplace for several commodity futures contracts in 1973. Among these were contracts for (1) bagged silver Canadian coins worth C$ 5,000 at face value, and (2) 12,500,000 Japanese yen. 2°W hile futures trading in silver coins was discontinued several months later after trading volume dwindled, yen futures still trade today with thousands of contracts changing hands every business day.
In hindsight, it seems clear that the convenience provided by a market for bagged Canadian silver coins was outweighed by transaction costs of some form.27 On the other hand, the successful introduction of a market for yen futures suggests that investors would have faced significant portfolio constraints in their absence. The contrast between these two raises an interesting question: are the incomplete systems of markets observed in the real world efficient in the sense that the missing markets are absent because they are not operationally cost-effective given current trading technology? Or, are they incomplete simply because no one has thought 24 fladner (1982), p. 930, for example, states that"... it clearly requires that the economic agents possess capabilities of imagination and calculation that exceed reality by many orders of magnitude." Geanakoplos (1990) , p. 2, states that, "There is little doubt that permitting the incompleteness of asset markets is a step in the direction of realism." 25 See, for example, Geanakoplos (1987) A full answer, unfortunately, is beyond the scope of this paper, although we return briefly to the issue below when considering futures markets. It is not a simple task to identify beforehand which missing markets impose the most significant constraints by their absence, and thus would be most likely to succeed with investors. The theory of complete markets does tell us, however, that, contingent on the level of transaction costs, identifying and providing such markets can make everyone involved better off. Not surprisingly then, much of the theoretical work in this area investigates the properties of economies where markets are incomplete. Some of the issues involved are presented in the following examples. and Bubbles gets all three fat portions. 3°D espite their differences, Jack and Bubbles recognize the value of trade. For example, the vector \~in the figure represents a sale of one pork chop from Bubbles to Jack, where Jack owns one pork chop before the sale and two pork chops afterward.
complete Markets and Efficient Allocations
Because there are two commodities but only one transaction (i.e., one payoff vector) in this example, the set of markets is incomplete. The single available market spans the 45-degree line in the payoff space of both consumers; each consumer can achieve any payoff where the number of fat and lean portions is given by some multiple of (1,1). Unfortunately, the optimal point, A", does not lie in the space spanned by this available market. The upshot is that the system of markets is incomplete, implying a suboptimal allocation of resources. In other words, the allocation of the six (fat and lean) portions here ideally would be represented by A~the unique Pareto-optimal allocation. The available market does not allow them to trade to this Now consider the allocation of a fixed set of pork chops, say three chops. between Jack and Bubbles. We represent this situation by the modified Edgeworth box in figure 1. Given the special preferences of Jack and Bubbles, there is a unique optimal allocation in this example, represented by the point A" in the lower-right-hand corner of the box. This is the point at which Jack gets all three lean portions of pork, 29 Recall that: "Jack Sprat could eat no fat I His wife could eat no lean I And so betwixt them both I They licked the platter clean."
29 Note:"To market,to market,to buy a fat pig/Home again, home again, jiggety-jig."
30 The optimal allocation is called Pareto-efficient by economists. With a Pareto-efficient allocation, no one can be made better off without harming someone else, In this particular example, there is only one Pareto-efficient allocation, because of the extreme nature of the preferences. In a less extreme case, there would be many Pareto-efficient allocations, depending on preferences, initial endowments and relative prices. a allocation, however, and Jack's fat goes to waste, as does Bubbles' lean, Now, let's complete the system of markets by adding a second allowable transaction: say that Jack and Bubbles agree to trim the fat from the chops and sell it separately to one another at a price of $P/2 per portion of fat, Thus the set of payoff vectors becomes:
The vector \' in the figure represents the sale of a single fat portion from Jack back to Bubbles. By thus completing the market, we have made the optimal allocation attainable."
This same principle of allocational efficiency can be seen at work in more general settings. The major contribution of Arrow and Debreu was to show that an efficient allocation of all commodities is feasible for an economy with complete markets, even with many periods, many physical goods and services, and uncertainty about the future." We next illustrate the importance of complete markets in this context, without considering a full general equilibrium model.
Future8 Markets and Risk-Shjfting
Uncertainty is a salient concern in many markets, It is common for contracts to require alternative payoffs in different states, Commodity futures contracts, for example, specify the exact physical characteristics of the commodity, the date of delivery and the location of delivery; moreover, they typically provide that 'If delivery or acceptance or any precondition or requirement of either is prevented by a strike, fire, accident, action of government or act of God," the directors of the exchange will decide the duties of buyer and seller."
From a practical perspective, ho\vever, the implicit state-dependent nature of such contracts is much more important than such explicit stipulations, Commodity futures contracts enable owners of a physical commodity to hedge the value of their inventory exactly against uncertain future fluctuations in price. The statepreference approach can provide useful insights into the nature of such markets, Futures markets allow people to contract today for future delivery of a specific commodity at a specific price. To see why such a contract is valuable, consider a hypothetical cotton market without a futures market, In particular, suppose that the current price of cotton is 71 cents per pound ($35.50 for a 50-lb. bale), and there are two states of the world, In one state, the price of cotton will increase to 80 cents per pound; in the other, it will fall to 70 cents per pound. Finally, assume borrowing and lending are possible at an interest rate of 5 percent over the period. Using the tools of statepreference theory, we can set up the payoff array in table 6. There will ultimately only be two cash markets for cotton here. We can either transact now in the spot market, or we can transact later in whichever of the two subsequent spot markets is available,
The Hedger
Now consider the situation of a cotton farmer who will harvest 25 tons of cotton in the coming period. To restrict the number of contingencies, we treat the size of the crop as certain, In terms of state-claims, this is the endowment (not a transaction) described in table 7. Finally, assume the farmer is risk-averse and wants his cash receipts to be the same, regardless of the state of the world, In other words, he wants a final consumption bundle, after harvesting and selling the crop, as described in table 8, Note that we must restrict the payoff $X to be strictly greater than $35,000 here, Otherwise, the farmer could achieve a certain payoff of $35,000 by giving away $5,000 in the high-price state of the world, The potential for arbitrage implies that he should be able to do better than this, Can he achieve his desired payoff with the current set of markets? 31 starting from the same initial allocation, where Jack has one chop and Bubbles two, Jack buys both chops from Bubbles and then sells back to her the three fat portions. I table 9 . Such a contract does not exist here, nor can it be synthesized as a combination of available contracts. In terms of our earlier discussion, the system of markets is incomplete. In I this case, the incompleteness prevents the farmer from arranging his desired payoff vector, Let's consider two ways of alleviating this constraint by completing the system of markets.
First, let's add storage (and leasing) of the physical commodity to the list of allowable transactions. In this example, no price is charged to store or lease cotton, although such a price could readily be included, In our simplified twostate, two-period example, this is sufficient to complete the system of markets. The payoff array is now given in table 10. To arrange the desired bundle, the farmer can now arrange the transactions in table 11, converting his endowment into a certain dollar amount next period. In other words, the farmer leases 25 tons of cotton, sells it for cash today and invests the proceeds, repaying the borrowed cotton when his own crop is harvested. Thus, it is possible, even in the absence of a futures market, to hedge 
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I the crop. 'his is achieved, however, through a There are three lessons here. First and forecircuitous and potentially costly chain of three most, completing the system of markets makes transactions. Why shouldn't the farmer arrange everyone better off (or at least not worse off) the desired transaction directly as a single by allowing risk to be transferred from the contract?
farmer to a speculator. Second, there is more -than one way to complete an incomplete system This is precisely the role of a futures contract, , -of markets. rhird, some means of completing a our second means of completing this system of
system of markets may be more cost-effective markets. A futures contract would have just .
--than others. One might even plausibly conjecthts payoff vector, perhaps adjusted by a scale --ture that all missing markets result from transfactor. A cotton future is a standardized for--action costs that render them cost-ineffective. ward sale contract; i.e., a contract to pay a spe-
Confirming or refuting such a conjecture, howcified price (P) for a standardized quantity (oO
ever, is beyond the scope of this paper. lbs. of cotton) at a specific time (next period), regardless of the state of the world, as described in table 12. The futures contract makes the marketplace more flexible; in our simple examThe Speculator pie, it completes the system of markets. It allows the farmer to transfer directly the price
The same transaction can also be considered risk associated with commodity ownership withfrom the perspective of the speculator who out transferring ownership of the commodity buys a futures contract from the farmer. A per se.
speculator is someone who wagers that she can 
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ccurately predict the state of the world. 34 To This concentrates the speculator's return on the see how speculation occurs in the absence of
• I
futures markets, we start with a market that allows for storage (and leasing) of cotton. If we omit cotton storage, as in table 6, then the sys tem of markets is incomplete; the speculator is thus prevented from arranging her desired payoff vector. Once again we complete the market in two different ways: with commodity market speculation and with futures market speculation.
In other words, to speculate on the low-price outcome in this world, the speculator must sell the physical commodity short. This requires leasing the commodity, selling it in the spot market and repurchasing the cotton later when the price has changed. These four transactions imply a profit if the cotton price falls and a loss if it rises. Finally, the speculator invests an amount equal to the discounted value of the I To make the problem more general, we now represent contract quantities (measured in lbs. of cotton) by C, and prices (measured as cents per lb. of cotton) by P. There are three prices, the current spot price P 0 , low price~L and a future high price P 11 (where P 11 >Pj. There is a single fixed interest rate R, at which the speculator can borrow and lend money. This payoff array is given in table 13. Let's say the speculator believes the low-price state will occur. In particular, she wants to arrange a transcotton in the high price state. If this state occurs, then the cost of repurchasing the cotton will be exactly covered by the investment; if the low price state occurs, the investment more than covers the repurchase of the cotton, and the difference is a speculative profit. The current cost of this basket is the proceeds of the spot sale, P 0 C, less the amount that must be invested, P 11 C/(1 +fl). This must be negative-i.e., a positive cost to the speculator-if an arbitrage opportunity is to be avoided.
action that pays only cash in the low price One must question the practicality of such a state. She can accomplish this by arranging the transaction, however. Once again, there is more bundle of transactions described in table 14.
than one way to complete a system of markets.
34 Note that the speculator is not necessarily a consumer of cotton. Indeed, a cotton consumer (e. g., a clothing manufacturer) is likely to be as risk-averse as the farmer. In etfect, a speculator sells insurance (i. e., bears risk) for a living.
aI In effect, a cash settlement futures contract (table 15) is a bundle of transactions sold as a single unit, where P. is the futures price. Note that, to eliminate arbitrage here, it must be the case that~F~L > 0 > P 6 P 11 . Such a standardized contract facilitates the transfer' of i-isk from hedgers to speculators. Moreover, with cash settlement, the speculator never has to handle the physical commodity sold in the futures contract, thus reducing transaction costs.
Options and .tnvestor Fleyibility
'The preceding example illustrated how the introduction of a futures contract, a paper transaction, could improve the allocation of resources in an economy.' 6 Such applications of state-preference theory are not limited to the futures markets. Art-ow (1964) showed that the ability to reallocate risk without otherwise constraining economic activity is a general property of securities markets. This principle can also he seen at work in the options market." ln considering an options example, we abstract from the issues of timing and consumption and concentrate on uncem'tainty, to streamline the example.
Options markets are especially useful for-shifting risks, because of a special characteristic of an option contract. In particular, a call option specifies a strike price, labeled K, at which the holder of the option can purchase the underlying commodity.'~By simply changing the strike price in an option contract, we can create a fundamentally different financial security. Thus, a 'single" options market provides the oppor-tunitv to exchange a multitude of state claims. To see how this works, consider the following example.
The Chicago Board of Trade Options Exchange (CBOE) trades options on the Standard and Poors' 500 stock index (S&,P 500), among other things." A call option on the S&P 500 with striking price of 295, theoretically gives the op-"In general, in order to eliminate arbitrage opportunities, every payoff vector must involve a trade-off, in which some element (including the current cost) of every vector is negative and some element of every vector is positive. In other words, every vector must represent an exchange of some sort rather than a unilateral gift.
36 In one sense, we have reallocated risk rather than resources. Recall, however, that we have redefined goods, so that cotton in the high-price state is a different resource from cotton in the low-price state.
"For more thorough analyses of options and complete markets, see Ross (1976) , and Arditti and John (1980) . ' 8 The 'commodity" in most options markets is really a share of a corporation's common stock. However, there are also organized options exchanges for cattle, copper, crude oil, Canadian dollars, etc. See the shaded insert on pp. 51-52 for a basic description of option contracts.
"The S&P 500 is a weighted average of 500 common stocks. tion holder the right to purchase the S&P 500 index at 295."°Because the weighting scheme involved in constructing the index involves 500 stocks, many held in fractional quantities, all of 'hich must then be scaled down to a relative value, however, it is impossible to purchase the exact S&P 500 index. Instead, cash settlement is used: at maturity, the holder of a call option Thus, our option to buy at 295 is a state claim. In the event that the value of the S&P 500 itself is less than 295, then the option is worthless, because the (approximate) index can be purchased in the open market for less than the strike price. If the index is worth more than 295, then the option is worth $500 times the difference between the actual price and the strike price. This is summarized in table 16.
It should be clear from our earlier examples that this system of markets is not complete. There is no way, for example, to arrange a portfolio that pays off exactly $50,000 if the S&,P 500 is below 300 and zero otherwise; i.e., ($50000,$50000,$50000,0,0,0). The special characteristic of options markets, however, is that linearly independent payoff vectors can be achieved by changing the striking price alone. Because of this, numerous options on the same security are actively traded. Many of these options differ only in their striking prices. Adding some of these options to our example, we get the payoff array in table 17.
This system of markets is complete. To achieve the payoff vector ($50000,$50000,$50000,0,0,0), for example, we can transact the amounts of the six listed call options described in tion of goods. This can be seen in the a [location of risks in futures and options markets, the ability to refine payoffs at the racetrack, or the distribution of fat and lean between Jack Sprat and his wife, Bubbles. The common implication in each example is that additional markets can improve the welfare of all concerned. That is, given the ability to reallocate, individuals will do so: they will exchange relatively less desirable commodity bundles for those that are, for them, relatively more desirable. A complete system of markets provides this ability. Thus, an economỹ 'vith greater flexibility in production, consumption and investment is uniformly preferable to one with less.
A second recurring theme is uncertainty.
Review Questions
(1) Using the payoff array in table 3, construct a book of bets that amounts to a pure security for the outcome T-C-M; i. e., make a book with the payoff vector (0,$1,0,0,0,0). What is the net investment required for this book of bets?
(2) Using the payoff array in table 3,, what is the probability, implicit in the bookmaker's odds, that the outcome of the race will be i'-C-M?
(3) Suppose the bookmaker offers a redundant bet with inconsistent odds. In particular, suppose the last bet in the payoff array in table 1 is changed, yielding the new array in table Qi. Construct an arbitrage portfolio (a portfolio that shows a positive net profit in all outcomes) from these bets.
(4) Ross shows that a necessary condition for a collection of securities to span the state space is that, 'for any two states there must be some asset whose payoffs distinguish between them." 1 Suppose we have instead a market in which no asset can distinguish between two states. In particular, consider
State-preference theory and the theory of complete markets are one way to incorporate uncertainty systematically in an economic model. This is central to a theory that includes an uncertain state of the world as a fundamental attribute of a good. One result is a recognition of the value of the ability to reallocate risk through financial transactions. While speculation in financial markets may or may not he unfettered gambling, the implicit transfer of risk from hedgers to speculators still produces economic value. 'I'he theory of complete markets thus provides a systematic explanation for the popularity and value of many so-called derivative securities, such as futures and options.
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the payoff array in table Q2, in which states E and F are indistinguishable by the available assets. Show that this system of markets is incomplete.
(5) Consider a speculator in the cotton market who believes that the price will rise. Assume that storage (and leasing) of cotton is not practical, but that a cash settlement futures market exists. In other words, assume the allowable transactions are those in 
